TRANSPARENCY OF FISCAL POLICY AS A TOOL TO PREVENT FISCAL POPULISM IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES

Keywords: fiscal transparency, fiscal populism, social expenditures, financial sustainability, fiscal discipline, public accountability

Abstract

The article examines fiscal populism in social expenditures and defines fiscal transparency as a key institutional instrument for preventing politically motivated budget decisions that weaken long-term sustainability and fiscal discipline. It conceptualizes fiscal populism as the expansion of social commitments or reduction of taxes and social contributions without reliable financing, forecasting, or evaluation of fiscal effects. The study identifies the main drivers in Ukraine: weak institutional accountability, limited disclosure of program data, electoral budget cycles that amplify pre-election transfers, and imbalances caused by ad hoc changes to the Unified Social Contribution. Drawing on the IMF Fiscal Monitor 2025, OECD fiscal governance guidance, and European Parliament analytical studies, the paper summarizes international recommendations on open budget data, independent audit, medium-term frameworks, and citizen participation in oversight. Using qualitative document analysis and comparative policy assessment, it links transparency tools with measurable reductions in wasteful or non-targeted social spending. The findings highlight that transparency limits discretion for short-term political giveaways through publication of program baselines, standardized cost-benefit appraisals, digital registers of recipients with ex-post verification, and parliamentary hearings based on performance indicators. The Ukrainian case shows that fragmented reporting and weak public communication allow fiscal populism to persist even under fiscal pressure. The article concludes that transparent planning and execution—supported by open data platforms, machine-readable reports, and cross-checks with social insurance funds—raise the political cost of unfunded promises and steer public debate toward evidence rather than slogans. Practical steps include medium-term ceilings, publication of distribution formulas, disclosure of contingent liabilities, uniform audit trails, and annual public evaluations to align social protection with fiscal responsibility and sustainable post-war recovery.

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Published
2025-10-27
How to Cite
Petlenko, Y. (2025). TRANSPARENCY OF FISCAL POLICY AS A TOOL TO PREVENT FISCAL POPULISM IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES. Economy and Society, (80). https://doi.org/10.32782/2524-0072/2025-80-10
Section
FINANCE, BANKING AND INSURANCE