

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32782/2524-0072/2025-80-3>

UDC 304:17.023.3-028.71

CURRENT TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION FROM UKRAINE TO THE EU UNDER MARTIAL LAW: SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECT

СУЧАСНІ ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ ТА НАСЛІДКИ МІГРАЦІЇ З УКРАЇНИ ДО ЄС В УМОВАХ ВОЄННОГО СТАНУ: СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНИЙ АСПЕКТ

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The article examines the current state of the population of Ukraine that left to the EU as a consequence of the full-scale invasion. The countries are analyzed by the number of temporary protections granted to our compatriots and the ratio to 1,000 local population is given. The main threats to both recipient countries and Ukraine are indicated. Factors that can contribute to and restrain return to the country are performed. The dynamics of remittances to Ukraine, which are declining compared to previous years, are studied. Current trends in the integration of the Ukrainian population in recipient countries and their economic inclusion in the economies of these countries and the labor market are also analyzed. It is noted that over time, an increasing number of Ukrainian migrants are employed, pay taxes, and reduce the use of Ukrainian bank cards. All this poses certain threats to Ukraine, as it potentially reduces the number of possible returns to the country.

Keywords: forced migrants, temporary protection, martial law, recipient country, remittances, integration, inclusion.

Метою даного наукового дослідження є аналіз сучасних тенденцій міграційних потоків з України в ЄС внаслідок військової агресії з боку росії та визначення наслідків, які це має для соціально-економічного розвитку як країн-реципієнтів, так і України зокрема. Актуальність наукової статті полягає в значній кількості населення України, які покинули нашу державу через безпекову ситуацію в країні та активні бойові дії. Основними групами населення, які були вимушенні виїхати є жінки та діти, що має стратегічну демографічну загрозу для України у разі їхнього неповернення. Для досягнення мети наукового дослідження нами було використано наступні методи: статистичний, аналізу, синтезу, порівняння, узагальнення, візуалізації. Основними результатами, які було отримано в ході дослідження стали: країнами, які найбільше прийняли наших шукачів тимчасового захисту, стали Німеччина, Польща та Чехія (з великим відривом від двох перших). Проте Чехія продемонструвала найбільшу кількість співвідношення тих, хто отримав тимчасовий захист до 1000 населення країни, що свідчить про достатньо високий відсоток вимушених мігрантів в країні. На основі наукових досліджень нами було наведено чинники, які можуть сприяти як поверненню в країну, так і стримувати цей процес, а також було визначено основні позитивні та негативні наслідки міграції з України. Але деякі позитивні моменти, які раніше були притаманні міграції за кордон, наразі зменшуються, як-то грошові перекази з країн ЄС в Україну. Також, важливим аспектом, який треба брати до уваги, є чинник часу. Чим довше наші співгромадяни знаходяться за кордоном, тим більше вони інтегруються в життя країни-надавача прихистку та стають частиною економічної системи тієї країни шляхом працевлаштування, сплати податків, здійснення споживчих операцій тощо. Все це несе демографічні загрози саме для України, адже знижує потенційну ймовірність повернення наших співгромадян додому. Практична цінність статті полягає в визначенні реальних потенційних загроз для

України через тривалість бойових дій на території держави та більш глибокої інтеграції вимушених мігрантів у країнах свого перебування. Для вирішення даної проблеми потрібна системна політика вітчизняного уряду, яка дозволить підвищити кількість населення, яке приймає рішення про повернення в Україну. Складність розв'язання даного питання полягає у продовженні війни та неможливості забезпечити фізичну безпеку співвітчизникам.

Ключові слова: вимушені мігранти, тимчасовий прихисток, воєнний стан, країна-реципієнт, грошові перекази, інтеграція, інклузія.

Statement of the problem. In the conditions of martial law in Ukraine, it is important to preserve not only the territorial integrity and economy of the country, but also human capital and its potential. But our country has faced a number of problems, one of which is the outflow of the population fleeing the war. The main region where the population of Ukraine mostly migrates is Europe and the countries of the European Union in particular. Given this, the problem arises that the number of migrants is significant and there is a risk of aggravating the demographic crisis in our country. Although there are positive consequences of such migration from our country, it is worth noting that they are not positive in the long term, but rather threatening. This is especially exacerbated by the time factor and further integration and inclusion in the life of the recipient country.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The subject of their scientific research of migration, its consequences for Ukraine and possible threats was the issue by such scientists as Libanova E.M. [1], Poznyak O.V., Tsymbal O.I. [2], Simakhova A.O., Tserkovny, I.O. [3], Tokar V.M., Gbur Z.V. [4], as well as Tucha O., Spivak I., Zholud O. [5]. They studied the main trends in migration flows as a result of the war in Ukraine, analyzed possible factors influencing and deterring return home, the dynamics of the use of Ukrainian bank cards, the degree of integration into the economies of recipient countries, etc.

Also, the issues of the dynamics of migration flows are deeply represented in the EU statistical database Eurostat [6], the current state of money transfers to Ukraine is studied by the National Bank of Ukraine [7-8], and the comparison of the level of wages, poverty level, employment of the local population and those who have received temporary protection status is the subject of research by international organizations, namely the UN Refugee Agency [9].

Highlighting previously unresolved parts of the overall problem. Despite the significant scientific achievements on this topic, there are issues that require further research. This is justified by the fact that this process is dynamic

and requires constant attention and updating of previously obtained data. Over time, the factors that influence the decision to potentially return to Ukraine or, conversely, not to return change. This poses a significant demographic threat to our country. That is why current research that allows analyzing the level of integration and inclusion of Ukrainian forced migrants in the EU is important and necessary for a real assessment of the situation in the country and society.

The purpose of this scientific article is to identify the main trends and consequences of forced migration from Ukraine to the EU under martial law, taking into account the socio-economic aspect and identifying potential threats to Ukrainian society and the country.

Presentation of the main research material. As of August 31, 2025, 4.37 million non-EU citizens who left Ukraine as a result of the full-scale war and moved to the EU were granted temporary protection. On the same date, the ratio of those who received temporary protection to the country's population was highest in the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia. In these countries, for every 1,000 people, there were 35.4 Ukrainians who left Ukraine due to the war in the Czech Republic, 27.3 in Poland and 25.4 in Estonia. This does not mean that these countries have the largest number of migrants from our country, but only means the share in the local population. During August 2025, the EU issued 53,070 decisions on temporary protection to Ukrainians, which is 15.3% lower than in July [6].

The largest number of refugees from Ukraine who have received temporary protection is in Germany – 1,210,515 people. The second place is by Poland, where 995,925 people have received temporary protection. The Czech Republic is far behind, with 385,855 people receiving temporary protection. And the smallest number of people who have received temporary protection is in Slovenia (10,600), Luxembourg (3,875), Malta (2,385) [6]. It is worth noting that such a small number of people in these countries is also justified by the size of the countries themselves. And the relatively small indicator of the Czech Republic (compared to Poland

and Germany) in terms of the total indicator of those who have received temporary protection, towards the ratio to the country's population, is the largest.

In Fig. 1 we present a visualization of the number of Ukrainians who left the country due to a full-scale invasion and received temporary shelter in the EU. This figure is constructed in the form of a treemap, where the size and color of the cells correspond to the magnitude of the value, i.e. the country with the highest value has the largest cell and the darkest color compared to the others.

Thus, we see that the largest number of refugees from Ukraine who have received temporary protection in the EU are in Germany, which confirms the information provided above. A slightly smaller number of people – about 1 million – received asylum in Poland. But in the Czech Republic, the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine is significantly smaller – slightly less than 400 thousand people. It is worth noting that the countries bordering Ukraine are not all leaders among those where the largest number of Ukrainians received temporary asylum. Thus, in Romania, their number reaches slightly less than 200 thousand people, which is less than

the figure in Spain. Slovakia has sheltered almost 135 thousand people, which is less than the figure in Italy (171.2 thousand people) and slightly exceeds the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands (almost 130 thousand people).

Fig. 2 presents the number of people from Ukraine who received temporary protection in relation to 1,000 people in the host country.

The results of the analysis of Fig. 2 show that countries that, although they are leaders in granting status to our compatriots, do not have the maximum number of asylum seekers by this indicator. Thus, the Czech Republic has the highest indicator in relation to its own population, 35.37. Poland and Estonia are slightly lower (27.29 and 25.38, respectively). It is worth noting the indicators of Cyprus and Slovakia, which are slightly lower than Estonia. However, Germany has a significantly lower indicator – 14.48. And the country with the lowest ratio to the local population is France, whose indicator is equal to 0.80. This gives reason to say that when managing migration flows and determining factors affecting recipient countries, it is important to take into account not only the total number of Ukrainian citizens who have received temporary asylum, but also the ratio to the



Fig. 1. Number of citizens who fled Ukraine and received temporary protection in the EU as of August 31, 2025

Source: constructed by the authors based on [6]




Fig. 2. Number of citizens who fled Ukraine and received temporary protection in the EU per 1,000 population as of August 31, 2025

Source: constructed by the authors based on [6]

population of the host country. This is important because of the burden placed on various socio-economic systems of the country. For example, if the proportion of Ukrainian citizens who have received asylum is high, this indicates a larger scale of measures and policies that should be implemented, such as the scale of educational measures to integrate preschool and school-age children into the educational environment. Or to what extent the asylum-seeking population will create competition on the labor market for the local population. It is quite logical to predict that the higher the ratio to 1,000 local population, the higher the risks for the host labor market.

In her scientific study on the prospects for the development of "war migration" from Ukraine, Libanova E.M. notes that among migrants who left Ukraine as a result of the war, women and

children predominate. The share of men who left Ukraine as a result of the war, over 18 years old, in 2024 was 20.7%. The share of children and adolescents aged 0 to 17 is 33.2%, and young women aged 18-34 is 16.4% [1]. As we understand, these figures indicate quite high rates of outflow of the female population and children, which poses a real demographic threat to Ukraine. That is, in addition to the threat of physical danger, there is a threat of non-return of a significant number of children and women.

Also, Libanova E.M. in the same study lists factors and conditions that will facilitate return to Ukraine, as well as factors and conditions that will hinder return home. We can illustrate them in Fig. 3.

As we can see, there are quite a lot of factors and conditions that may encourage or discourage

Factors and conditions that will facilitate return to Ukraine

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- Ukrainian women often have more qualifications than are required for the job they are employed for in the host country;
- have to change profession;
- loss of usual social status;
- communication and adaptation problems;
- reduction in cash assistance;
- dissatisfaction with the quality of children's education and their integration into the environment;
- desire for family reunification;
- quality and convenience of receiving medical services.

Factors and conditions that will hinder return to Ukraine

<input type="checkbox"/>	
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- constant shelling of the territory of Ukraine;
- problems with energy and heat supply due to shelling of critical infrastructure;
- there is a well-established belief that children have better prospects for living and studying abroad;
- difficulties in finding employment after a break in work;
- medical insurance coverage for the treatment of a patient that is not available in Ukraine;
- fear of condemnation from those who did not leave Ukraine;
- in the case of family breakdown due to long-term separation, there is no reason to return to the country;
- already accustomed to a new way of life and afraid of changing a more or less stable life.

Fig. 3. Factors and conditions that will facilitate or hinder return to Ukraine

Source: constructed and supplemented by the authors based on [1]

the return to Ukraine. They concern both the professional sphere and the communication, medical, security, personal, and other spheres. In our opinion, it is difficult to apply real measures and mechanisms during the war that would facilitate the return of the female population with children.

Also, factors that influence the decision-making in one direction or another include the general economic situation in Ukraine, the policy of the countries that provided protection towards this group of people. Namely, the policy of integration into society, employment policy, policy of providing educational and medical services, provision of financial assistance, etc [2].

Simakhova A. O. and Tserkovny I. O. in their scientific study cited both positive and negative consequences of migration processes from

Ukraine under martial law. Thus, among the positive ones they highlighted: reduced pressure on the country's economy due to emigration outside Ukraine; preservation of the lives of people who left the country; reduced pressure on the domestic labor market; improved economic situation due to remittances from migrants, etc. Among the negative ones they highlighted: migration and demographic crisis; loss of human capital; withdrawal of assets abroad, etc [3]. We share the opinion of these scientists regarding the positive and negative consequences for Ukraine. They have an impact not only on the economic development of the country, but also on the social component. We can also add that a negative consequence may be the relocation of business by foreign investors, the withdrawal of assets by foreign investors and the cessation

of activities in Ukraine. This has a significant long-term negative effect on the economy of our country.

We also consider it useful to indicate the number of remittances from the EU that were made to Ukraine during a certain period. Fig. 4 shows the volume of private remittances to Ukraine from the EU since 2018. The volumes presented are provided by the National Bank of Ukraine and represent transfers through official and unofficial channels of receipt. It is also worth noting that data for 2022 were not collected in February-April 2022, which actually makes it possible to indicate the volume of private remittances for the second half of 2022.

So, according to this figure, we see that the volume of private remittances has an uneven tendency to change. In the pre-war period, fluctuations were observed, with a decrease in 2020, which may be due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reduced ability of those who were in the EU to receive money and, accordingly, transfer it to Ukraine. Further growth in 2021 was replaced by a decrease in 2022, which is also justified, firstly, by the lack of data for the first half of 2022, and, secondly, by the need for those who were in the EU to support and provide for themselves. If we take into account that the majority of those who left for the EU from Ukraine are women with children, then it is quite logical that they need to provide for themselves in

their new place of residence. Further significant growth in 2023 was replaced by a gradual decline in 2024 and a rather noticeable decline in 2025. Although the 2025 indicator is for the first half of the year, it is noticeably lower even compared to 2022. Therefore, we see that there is a trend towards a decrease in remittances from migrants to Ukraine, which could potentially reduce the positive impact on the economic situation in the country.

Also, over time, people are increasingly integrated in their countries of residence, become more inclusive into society and economy, which increases the risks of their non-return to Ukraine. From the financial point of view, it is worth noting that those who have received temporary protection are employed in recipient countries and use Ukrainian bank cards less. It is noted that asylum recipients are increasingly burdening local social protection systems, while simultaneously increasing their role in the economies of these countries due to the aforementioned employment and significant consumer spending. There is an increase in the employment of forced migrants in the EU, differing by country. It is justified that it is higher in countries that did not emphasize long-term integration, but focused more on temporary protection. In 2024, in Poland, the employment rate of Ukrainian migrants who left the country as a result of the war was 53%-71% (according to various estimates).




Fig. 4. Volume of private remittances to Ukraine from the EU, 2018 – H1 2025

Source: constructed by the authors based on [7; 8]

In the Czech Republic – approximately 60%, and in Romania – 43%. However, the problem for our forced migrants in the labor market of these countries is that there is a tendency for them to be employed in jobs of inappropriate qualifications, mainly unskilled, which involve quick employment. Countries that provide high social benefits and are focused on long-term integration record a lower level of employment among Ukrainian asylum seekers. An example is Germany, where the employment rate of Ukrainians is one of the lowest – approximately 25%. The result of employment in low-skilled jobs is lower wages compared to the local population [5]. Despite the increase in the average regional wage of refugees by 28%, this indicator still remains 30% lower than the local population. Thus, the difference is noticeable in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania. However, in Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania this difference is smaller. Still noticeable Bulgaria, that demonstrates almost equalization of this indicator in 2024 between the local population and Ukrainian forced migrants [9].

In development of this, we will also present figures of the positive impact of Ukrainian asylum seekers on the economy of recipient countries. Thus, according to a study by Tucha O., Spivak I. and Zholudya O., Ukrainians' contributions to the Polish budget in the form of taxes are currently higher than the social assistance received. A similar situation is observed in the Czech Republic, where in 2022 the costs of Ukrainian forced migrants were twice as high as their contributions to the Czech budget, and already in 2023 the balance was balanced due to both a decrease in expenses and an increase in income [5].

Taking into account the above, we see that the contribution of Ukrainians to the economy of recipient countries is significant, which is justified by their deeper integration and inclusion into the life of the country, both employment and payment of taxes, consumer spending. This is a positive socio-economic consequence for those countries, as well as for the forced migrants themselves. However, this carries threats to their return to Ukraine. Since it strengthens their positions in the host country. And it can be assumed that the longer martial law is in Ukraine and the threat to the lives of the population, the less likely it is that people will return, especially if they are already integrated into society. This is an additional demographic threat to our country. However, it is worth noting that there are still

problems with the integration and inclusion of Ukrainian asylum seekers. These include language barriers, which can create obstacles to employment in a job according to their qualifications, lower wages for forced migrants, and the very nature of the work in which our displaced persons can be employed. All this makes it potentially possible to return a portion of forced migrants, when this becomes possible, taking into account the security situation.

Conclusions. Thus, we can conclude that the number of forced migrants who left Ukraine as a result of hostilities and received temporary protection in the EU is quite high. The number of migrants varies depending on the country, but the largest number of them is in Germany and Poland. The Czech Republic is in third place, but the number of forced migrants there is much smaller than in the first two countries. However, the Czech Republic has the highest ratio of those who received temporary shelter in the country relative to domestic population, which indicates a high proportion of forced migrants in this country. Forced migrants carry both threats and positive consequences for the recipient country, and the consequences of such migration of Ukrainians are both positive and negative for Ukraine itself. Currently, the issue of the future return of such a significant number of people home is acute. Since, in the event of their non-return, this will have significant negative demographic consequences. We have listed the main factors that contribute to both return and non-return. They are relevant and fully justified. Their content may change depending on the security and economic situation in Ukraine. Time also plays an important role in this, which, unfortunately, is not in our favor. Research by scientists shows that Ukrainians are increasingly integrated into local labor markets, making a positive contribution to the economies of recipient countries. However, we cannot but mention that the level of work in which they are employed largely does not correspond to their qualifications and level of education, as well as the differences in the level of wages between the local population and Ukrainian migrants. All this indicates the significant socio-economic consequences for our country that the situation with the forced migration of the Ukrainian population has and will have in the future. Given that a significant part of this population group is children, this poses an additional demographic threat, as they integrate into society more quickly and are more likely to not return than their parents. In this case, the

Ukrainian government needs to develop a long-term inclusive policy that will be focused on the return of our citizens, which will allow solving important socio-economic problems in society and the country.

The scientific research is carried out within the framework of implementation of international projects Jean Monnet Module "EU Practices of Social and Economic Inclusion" (Jean Monnet

Module 101127466 – EPSEI – ERASMUS-JMO-2023-HEI-TCH-RSCH).

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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